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Abstract 
The advances in adaptive learning dynamics to pure Nash equilibria in game theory provide promising results for the modeling of 
selfish agents with limited information in congestion games. In this study, a distributed game-theoretical learning algorithm with 
real-time information provision for dynamic congestion games is proposed. The learning algorithm is based on the regret 
matching process by considering a user’s previously realised payoffs and real-time information. The numerical studies show that 
the proposed algorithm can converge to a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in both static and dynamic congestion networks. 
Moreover, the proposed algorithm leads to a plausible real-time route choice modeling framework based on a user’s perception 
being updated by incorporating the user’s past experience, real-time information and behaviour inertia. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B. V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of EWGT2014. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the Vehicular ad hoc Network (VANET), which enables vehicles and infrastructures to share 
information between themselves and to coordinate their actions to achieve a safer and more fluent mobility, has 
become an active research area in the field of transportation and computer science (Pigné, Danoy and Bouvry, 
2010). Real-time traffic information enables road users (hereafter called users) to take alternative routes to avoid 
traffic congestion areas and also provides another possibility for route guidance service. With the development of 
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VANET, how users adaptively learn optimal / better routes on a day-to-day or within-day basis using information 
updates are active research issues in transportation science.  
The empirical studies on the route choice behaviour of a user show that a user’s day-to-day route choice 
dynamics depends on their perception of travel times and the traffic conditions information available (Jha et al. 
1998; Selten et al. 2004). Users have adaptive route learning behaviours based on their past experiences. It is 
important to model the process of perception updating in a user’s route choice behaviour when provided with 
information. Different modeling approaches based on discrete choice theory and control theory have been suggested 
for this issue in the past (Peeta and Yu, 2004, 2005; Jha et al. 1998). Jha et al. (1998) recognised that a user’s route 
choice behaviour depends on their perception of travel times and available traffic information and proposed a 
Bayesian model for perception updating. However, in this model, perception was only updated on a day-to-day basis 
and could not capture the impact of real-time information on driver route perception updates. To address this issue, 
Peeta and Yu (2004, 2005) incorporated a driver’s subjective perception of route attributes and real-time information 
for driver route choice modeling. A hybrid model with fuzzy if-then rules is suggested to model a driver’s within-
day route choice dynamics using situational route attributes. The proposed model can capture a driver’s perception 
updates for routes based on both travel time as realised day-to-day and on within-day real-time information.  
In line with these studies, a driver’s learning process in congestion game theory seems particular interesting for 
modeling a driver’s route choice behaviour (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Based on the information that users have 
available to them, we can distinguish two types of congestion games (Miyagi and Peque Jr., 2012). The first one is 
called informed-user congestion game in which users have no information about the payoff function (travel time 
related) of a route but they can be informed by a global system administrator about the payoffs realised by all other 
users on a day-to-day (iterative) basis. The second type is called native-user (non-informed user) game in which 
each user has no information about his payoff function. Users make their routing decisions based only on their past 
experiences and adapt their choices on a day-to-day basis. As far as the learning process is concerned, Hart and 
Mas-Colell (2000) proposed a simple intuitive learning process towards correlated equilibrium called regret 
matching. This procedure states that each user chooses his action based on a strategy (choice probabilities) which is 
proportional to the regret of each action, measured as a positive payoff difference between the average payoff of that 
particular action and the overall average payoff over the choice set. This learning rule is similar to reinforcement 
learning and has been found in several experiments in psychology and experimental economics (Megiddo, 1980; 
Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 2005). The authors proved that this simple adaptive procedure converges to a 
correlated equilibrium of games with probability of one in a general n-player repeated game. In line with this 
direction, Marden et al. (2009b) proposed a payoff-based process for the native-user game in which each user 
chooses his past best action with a high probability but randomly chooses another route with a small exploration 
rate. The authors demonstrated that the proposed simple adaptive experimentation learning algorithm converges to 
Nash equilibria with an arbitrary high probability if sufficient iterations are implemented. Cominetti et al. (2010) 
proposed an alternative payoff-based adaptive process based on a user’s past payoffs towards Nash equilibrium. The 
authors applied this procedure to model a user’s adaptive routing behaviour in a congestion game and analysed its 
convergence property based on a dynamic system approach. The existing studies showed that an intuitive plausible 
adaptive learning process could achieve a non-cooperative equilibrium in a multi-agent system.    
The above non-cooperative payoff-based learning process is very promising for modeling a user’s adaptive route 
choice behaviour since it mimics a plausible user’s knowledge-based learning process. Existing studies are based on 
a path choice decision scheme in a static congestion game setting, which is inconvenient for modeling the real-time 
route perception updating process triggered when unusual congestions / accidents occur. To the best of our 
knowledge, a related game-theoretical development in modeling the real-time information impact on dynamic 
congestion games and the resulting route choice adaptive learning process is still less studied. Different with the 
adjustment process of link flows toward a user equilibrium state (Guo et al., 2013), the proposed algorithm provides 
a microscopic approach to model each user’s real-time route choice behaviour towards such a user-optimal 
equilibrium.  
In this study, a distributed game-theoretical based learning algorithm with real-time information provision in a 
dynamic road network is proposed. Our contribution is to develop an adaptive learning algorithm for non-
cooperative, multiple users with plausible decision rules with real-time information provision. We analyse the effect 
of real-time local information (congestion information received from neighbourhood links) on a user’s route choice 
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decision using different proportions of informed users. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 recalls the 
regret matching process for n-player repeated games. Section 3 proposes a distributed leaning algorithm based on 
the regret matching process by incorporating real-time traffic state estimations. Section 4 reports the numerical study 
of both a static case and a dynamic case. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future extensions are discussed. 
2. Regret matching algorithm for n-user congestion games 
Let us first recall the regret matching learning process in games (Young, 2005; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000). 
Consider an n-player repeated game with a set of players ^ `nI ,...,2,1 . Each player i has an action set iA  and a 
payoff function RAui o:  with nini AAAAA uuu u  ...21,...1 . Let ),( ii aaa   be an action profile of all 
players where ia  is the action taken by player i and ^ `niii aaaaa ,...,,,..., 111    is the action profile of the other 
players except player i. We call a pure Nash equilibrium if for all players Ii  the following condition holds: 
),(max),( *** iiiAaiii aauaau ii 
                                                                                                                        (1) 
where *ia  is the optimal action of player i. 
In a repeated game, each player i takes an action ia  and receives a payoff )( ii au . The strategy of a player is 
assumed to follow a simple adaptive learning process based on his received payoffs in the past. At each iteration, 
each player first evaluates the empirical average payoff for each action as well as the empirical overall average 
payoff up to the current iteration. Afterwards, he computes a payoff difference (average regret) for each action. 
Based on the regret values, each player chooses an action with a probability proportional to its average regret for not 
choosing that action in the past. The empirical overall average payoff of player i, calculated up to iteration w , can be 
obtained as 
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The positive regret of an action represents a payoff gain if player i has chosen that action in the past. The choice 
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where wiA  is the set of actions of player i at iteration w . The operation is xx  ][  if 0!x  else 0. In (5), if the 
denominator is 0, random choice is applied.  
Note that in (5), the choice probability of an action is proportional to its positive average regret. Another alternative 
is based on a Logit function specification. However, it is generally difficult to determine its sensitivity parameter to 
guarantee convergence behaviour. As a result, we apply (5) for computing the action choice probabilities. 
As an individual may explore some new actions in his learning process, we can then incorporate an 
experimentation strategy with an exploration rate 10 d H  in the regret matching process. Hence the choice 
probability of an action can be written as: 
 i) Drawing a random number 9  with 10 dd 9 ,   
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, given that its denominator is positive. If the above denominator is zero, randomly select an action from wiA . 
 ii) otherwise 
    iiv
w Aap /)( H  for iiv Aa                                                                                                                             (7) 
where wiA  is the set of realised actions of player i up to iteration w. iA  is the number of actions in iA . H  is a 
constant exploration rate which reflects that a user’s choice is not completely deterministic but has some stochastic 
component (Young, 2005). Note that H  can also be replaced by a numerical divergent series to model the 
stabilisation of a user’s explorative behaviour. The equation above shows that an individual chooses either an action 
from his set of previously realised actions or a random action.     
Note that in real-time situations, users might face unusual events such as congestions or accidents where they 
have to update their perception (belief) of travel time to destination. The estimations of additional travel times can 
be obtained via external information sources such as traffic message boards or the broadcasting of traffic 
information. The en-route travel time perception dynamics influences a user’s travel route choice and needs to be 
taken into account in modeling route choice learning processes. This issue will be addressed in the next section.     
3. Distributed regret matching algorithm with information provision 
Consider a real-time routing problem with information provision in a dynamic congestion game. The term 
“dynamic” means that users can receive real-time traffic information and make en-route route changes in a dynamic 
network. Let G(N, E) be a directed graph representing a road network where N is a set of nodes and E a set of links. 
We assume that there are a finite number of heterogeneous users, i.e. informed users and non-informed users. The 
underlying routing policy for these users is based on the regret matching process. We model a user’s en-route 
routing process by a sequential Markov decision process (MDP) in a stochastic environment. The MDP assumes that 
users observe the environment (traffic conditions) and make an action (route choice) at each state (node or link of a 
road network) to receive a reward (negative utility of travel time). The MDP is suitable to model a user’s en-route 
path choice behaviour with updating of real-time route attribute perception because it can incorporate a user’s 
sequential decisions under uncertainty. In contrast to static path-based congestion game settings (Miyagi and Peque 
Jr., 2012), our approach is node-based and includes the learning of optimal routing policy. At each step, each user 
chooses a downstream link toward his destination such as to minimise his expected travel times. Note that there is 
the option of applying a more realistic multi-criteria route choice behaviour (Peeta and Yu, 2005; Wahle et al., 
7 Tai-Yu Ma and Philippe Gerber /  Transportation Research Procedia  3 ( 2014 )  3 – 12 
2002). The advantage of our approach resides in its flexibility in capturing the behavioural heterogeneity of users 
and their reaction elasticities with respect to traffic information.    
Let the MDP process be represented by a tuple !  RPASM ,,, , where S is a finite set of states of the 
environment, A is a finite set of actions, P is a one-step state transition function and R is a payoff function. In the 
context of users’ routing policy learning, the state variable is a user’s current node in the network at time t. The 
action to be taken is an outgoing link choice in a user’s process of route searching to destination. The one-step state 
transition function is the regret-matching routing policy representing a mapping from the perceived states of the 
environment to a set of actions. The payoff function is the expected travel time from current link to destination, 
which represents a user’s real-time route travel time perceptions. Each user is assumed to choose links with expected 
least travel times to destination.  
Let s and e denote a node and a link in the network, respectively. s’ denotes a successor of s which constitutes a 
link )',( sse . Let )(eCwi  denote user i’s experienced travel time for link e at iteration w. )(eu
w
i  is user i’s payoff 
function for a path from e to his destination at iteration w, defined as the negative experienced travel time from the 
head of link )',( sse  to that user’s destination: 
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where ),'( idsr  is a path from the tail node 's  of link e to user i’s destination id . )'(eCwi  is the realised travel time 
of link 'e  for user i at iteration w. This value can only be correctly evaluated a posteriori once the user arrives at his 
destination. In an en-route path choice context, each user could estimate it based on his past experiences up to 
iteration w-1 and on the real-time information received. For this purpose, we define an empirical potential function 
)'(sV  as the maximum of the average payoff realised (minimum of the realised average travel time) from a node s’ 
to a user’s destination as:  
^ ` ])'()'(
1[max)'(
1
0
'1''
1 ¦
 
*
  
w
irew
i
)(se
w
i euIen
sV
iW
W
W                                                                                                     (9) 
where )'(s* is the set of outgoing links of node s’ and ^ `¦   
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ir  being the path of user I at 
iteration W . This potential function is updated on a day-to-day basis reflecting the updating of a user’s day-to-day 
perception based on his routing experiences. The en-route estimation of the payoffs at iteration w for e with real-
time information can then be obtained as 
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where 's  is the end node of e. )(1 eC wi
  is the average experienced travel time of link e for user i up to iteration w-1, 
calculated as  
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where Wir  is the path used by user i at iteration W . )(ewi[  is real-time delay information on  e which is assumed to 
be available only for informed users when arriving at the head node of link e. This delay is frequently estimated (e.g. 
3 minutes) as the average delay time in a link queue during the most recently updated period of information as given 
by a system provider. Note that more realistic travel time estimation approaches can also be applied to obtain more 
precise travel time predictions (Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis, 2013).   
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The user i’s empirical average payoff from node s to destination at iteration w is defined as  
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where )(sui
W  is the realised payoff for user i from node s to his destination at iteration W . )(1 snwi   is the number of 
times that node s is part of the paths used by user i up to iteration w-1.   
The average regret of not choosing an action )',( sse  for user i at iteration w is estimated based on (9) for each 
outgoing link e of current node s as 
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w
i
w
i                                                                                                                                     (13) 
where s is the head node of link e. 
Based on real-time updating of travel time perception, users make their route choices based on the regret 
matching routing policy of (6) and (7). The proposed regret matching algorithm is described as follows.  
 
Main Algorithm 
Step 1: Initialisation. Set )(0 sVi  as free flow travel time on the shortest paths from any node s to a user i’s 
destination. The rationale is that each user has prior knowledge of free flow travel times in a network. Each 
user uses an initial shortest path to destination. When all users arrive at their destinations, compute their 
realised payoffs for selected routes. Each user updates his perception in terms of the potential function (9), 
average link travel time (11) and the average payoff function of a node (12). Set iteration (day) index w=1.  
Step 2: Dynamic network loading. Each user makes his route choice progressively based on the regret matching 
process (13), (6) and (7), moves on the network until arriving at destination.  
Step 3: When arriving at destination, each user computes the realised payoffs (8) and updates the empirical  
       potential function for each node (9), the average experienced link travel time of link (11) and the  
       empirical average payoff function of a node (12). 
Step 4: Repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until a stabilisation of gaps is achieved. The gap represents how far the 
experienced travel times of all users are from the ideal travel times on shortest paths. 
4. Numerical study 
The numerical study is divided into two parts. First, we test the regret matching algorithm on a static network to 
illustrate the convergence toward a near Nash equilibrium. Then, a dynamic network is implemented to show the 
performance of the proposed algorithm with respect to different proportions of informed and non-informed users 
and to normal/accident scenarios.  
4.1.  Static network with native users 
The static network is composed of N parallel paths connecting one origin-destination pair as shown on the left 
side of Fig. 1 (Marden et al. 2009a). The path travel time is calculated by a quadratic travel time function with 
positive random parameters. We set D users who initially select their paths randomly and adjust their respective path 
choices iteratively based on the regret match process of (6) and (7). Fig.1 (right side) shows the convergence of path 
flows to near user equilibrium with stochastic frustration. It shows that the proposed distributed regret matching 
process achieves a near Nash equilibrium based on their realised payoffs. This small example shows that the simple 
intuitive distributed learning process can achieve a non-cooperative correlate equilibrium. When further 
investigating the impact of different demands and the number of paths, we found that the proposed learning process 
is stable in terms of its convergence (Fig. 2). In the static case, the proof of convergence is provided by Hart and 
Mas-Colell (2000). We argue that the proposed distributed learning algorithm exhibits a similar convergence pattern 
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to a near Nash equilibrium in a general road network. However, the proof of convergence on a general network 
needs to be studied in the future.  
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Fig. 1. A static test network with N paths (left); evolution of the path flows of the regret matching process (right). The flat lines are path flows at 
user equilibrium obtained by the method of successive averages (Powell and Sheffi, 1982) 
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Fig. 2 Influence of demands on the convergence (left); impact of the number of paths on the convergence (right). 
4.2. Dynamic congestion games with heterogeneous users 
4.2.1. Network characteristics 
The dynamic network is composed of 32 nodes and 94 links as shown in Fig. 3. The applied traffic flow model is 
based on the point queue model (Gawron, 1998; Ma and Lebacuqe, 2013; Ma 2014) to capture dynamic traffic flow 
congestion effects with link flow capacity constraints. Note that the simplistic point queue model can represent 
realistic microscopic traffic flow propagation (Gawron, 1998). A more realistic traffic flow model can be applied if 
needed (Lebacque and Khoshyaran 2005). The link length is randomly set between 3 and 3.5 km. The free flow 
speed is 50 km/hr and the maximum capacity per lane is 1200 vehicles/hour/lane. The number of lanes is set at 2 for 
orthogonal links and 1 for the other links. For the sake of simplicity there are four origins and one destination. 
Travel demand (number of users) increases gradually until it reaches the peak hour traffic flow of 2160 cars/hr then 
decreases gradually to 240 cars/hr (left side of Fig.4). For the sake of simplicity we suppose that the departure time 
is randomly generated within given departure time intervals. To analyse the dynamics of users’ travel times and the 
impact of real time information on a user’s adaptive route choice behaviour, different proportions of informed and 
non-informed users are tested. Moreover, two scenarios reflecting normal/accident situations are designed as 
follows. 
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Scenario 1: No accident occurs.  
Scenario 2: One accident occurs at node 22, resulting in link capacity reduction to half for incoming links e(17,22), 
e(18,22), e(21,22), e(23,22) during the day (iteration) 30. This day is determined on the assumption that users have 
gained reliable knowledge about network performance until one day before.  
The simulation is based on a discrete event simulation technique implemented in C++.  
 
5 9 131 17
6 10 142 18
7 11 153 19
8 12 164 20
Origin (o)
Destination (d)
21 25 29
22 26 30
32 27 31
24 28 32
The number in each 
node is its ID  
 
Fig. 3. A dynamic test network 
4.2.2. Numerical result 
Firstly, we investigate the convergence property of the proposed learning algorithm when all users are non-
informed users. Travel time delays over time are compared for informed and non-informed users employing real-
time information provision. For informed users, traffic information is given in terms of an average link travel time 
delay, calculated at three minute intervals by a system administrator, as stated by equations (10)-(11). The right side 
of Fig. 4 displays the convergence result for scenario 1 with the presence of non-informed users only. The result is 
as expected since users update their perceptions of travel time to destination based on their past experiences. The 
impact of the exploration rates show that the smaller the exploration rate is, the closer it will converge to Nash 
equilibrium. Fig. 5 depicts the results of the algorithm using differing proportions of informed users. In a normal 
situation (day 29), informed users benefit from regularly updated real-time information about travel time delays in 
such a way as to update their estimates of travel time to destination. As a result, they can switch to less congested 
routes with less delay to destination, on condition that the proportion of informed users is below a certain threshold 
(upper part in Fig. 5). However, when most users are informed users, they might actually suffer increased travel time 
delays. This result is similar to the over-reaction effects in a reactive route guidance system (Ben-Akiva et al., 
1996). When investigating the impact of an accident on travel time delay for different classes of users in the 
unexpected accident scenario (scenario 2), we found that all users suffer more travel time delays due to the 
reductions in road capacity on the accident links. Due to the effects of over-reaction on local congestion 
information, informed users might experience travel time delay increases in the unexpected accident situation given 
a high market penetration of informed users (lower part in Fig. 5).       
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Fig. 4 Time-dependent travel demand (Left); convergence result with respect to different exploration rates on the dynamic network (right). 
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Fig. 5 Travel time delays over time with different proportions of informed users in normal and accident situations.   
5. Conclusions 
In this study we propose a distributed regret matching learning algorithm for computing non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium in the context of dynamic day-to-day and within-day route choices. The route adjustment behaviour is 
based on perception updates regarding routes based on a user’s realised payoffs and the real-time information 
received. The numerical results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm converges to a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium in both static and dynamic networks. Moreover, we investigate the impact of real-time information on a 
user’s route choice behaviour by distinguishing users as informed (access to real-time delay information) and non-
informed.  
The numerical results show that when the proportion of informed users is below a certain threshold, the real-time 
information is beneficial in reducing their travel time delay using less congested routes. However, when most users 
are informed users, they might suffer more significant travel delays due to the over-reactions of all these informed 
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users. We consider that our proposed learning algorithm is flexible by explicitly incorporating a user’s route 
perception updating process based on a user’s realised payoffs, real-time information and stochastic choice 
behaviour. Further extensions would involve incorporating multi-criteria decision-making theory into more realistic 
route choice behaviour modeling. Moreover, more advanced travel time prediction methods and traffic flow models 
would also need to be investigated in the future. 
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